‘Backing the wrong horse’: Japan in British Middle Eastern Policy 1914–18

The course of Anglo‐Japanese relations prior to 1914 rendered senior British policymakers nervous regarding possible Japanese aggrandisement in the Middle East. This article explores the factors which precluded British acceptance of Japanese military involvement there when, both before and during World War I, the idea was discussed. Particular reference is made to the views of the India Office and to those of Lord Curzon and the subject is analysed in the broader context of British Middle Eastern policy.     

Defeating Balkan Insurgency: The Austro-Hungarian Army in Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1878-82

The occupation and pacification of Bosnia-Hercegovina by Austro-Hungarian forces between 1878 and 1882 constitutes a politico-military rarity: a major colonial-style campaign waged in Europe. Yet Vienna's 1878-82 operations in Bosnia - including a hard-fought, multi-corps invasion followed by a sustained counterinsurgency campaign to put down lingering resistance to Habsburg rule - remain little known even among scholars of the region and counterinsurgency experts. However, their strategic lessons are of import today, as Vienna's battlefield successes in Bosnia brought a degree of peace and stability to the region that it has rarely known in modern times. Moreover, Austro-Hungarian military leaders waged a victorious campaign in the field that strengthened political objectives, and provided a textbook example of how to vigorously wage a counterinsurgency campaign against religiously-inspired foes in harsh terrain without undermining the occupier's political legitimacy.     

The impact of Islamic State’s ideological correction initiative on al Qaeda’s bid for relevance

ABSTRACT

Al Qaeda following 9-11 experienced a period of stagnation which it sought to remedy through a project of re-branding. Critical of this approach, Islamic State claimed that al Qaeda was an elitist organization that had facilitated the stagnation of the Salafi Jihadist project. In an attempted to claim dominance over the jihad, Islamic State’s endeavored to discredit al Qaeda through a process it presented as ideological correction, linked to Islamic eschatology, sectarian agitation, permissive violence, and the caliphate. Following Islamic State’s acquisition of vast territory in Iraq and Syria, arguments proliferated that Islamic State had surpassed al Qaeda. As the caliphate has collapsed what effects will this have on al Qaeda’s fortunes and strategy? It is argued that Islamic State has provided al Qaeda’s strategic approach with renewed vigour to help ensure its survival and pursue resurgence. Al Qaeda acting in concert with the meta-strategy for survival concept, has altered an existential threat into an advantage through disavowing Islamic State’s methods, continuing to engage with localism, and pursuing rebranding by positioning itself as a moderate alternative. The cases of al Qaeda affiliates in Yemen, Syria, West Africa, and South Asia are instructive in assessing the effectiveness of al Qaeda’s resurgence.     

Lessons in airpower projection: Indochina and Algeria

The lessons from the two French counterinsurgencies, Indochina and Algeria, give rise to a new understanding of the projection of airpower in remote and hostile environments and the purpose, design, and use of aircraft in counterinsurgency. In both Indochina and Algeria, the campaigns were ones of poverty, and it is their imaginative management under severe resource constraints that provides thoughtful and applicable lessons for today. In both cases, airpower held the promise of delivering victory and solving the resource issue. In Indochina, acquisition of the needed aircraft, operating knowledge, and experience came too slowly to realize this promise. In Algeria, the French embraced the lessons from Indochina and were quite successful and innovative in the use of airpower. The lessons can be reduced to four requirements: (1) a network of airfields for liaison, ground-support, and intra-theater airlift to enable effective air support of ground forces; (2) a solid, reliable, and simple ground-support aircraft capable of operating from forward airfields within range of ground engagements; (3) a capable intra-theater heavy-lift transport to supply the extended ground forces; and (4) helicopter capability to enhance tactical troop mobility and support.